The Over-Extended Mind? Pink Noise and the Ethics of Interaction-Dominant Systems by Meacham, Darian & Prado Casanova, Miguel
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Over-Extended Mind? Pink Noise and the Ethics
of Interaction-Dominant Systems
Darian Meacham & Miguel Prado Casanova
Received: 22 November 2017 /Accepted: 5 October 2018
# The Author(s) 2018
Abstract There is a growing recognition within cogni-
tive enhancement and neuroethics debates of the need
for greater emphasis on cognitive artefacts. This paper
aims to contribute to this broadening and expansion of
the cognitive-enhancement and neuroethics debates by
focusing on a particular form of relation or coupling
between humans and cognitive artefacts: interaction-
dominance. We argue that interaction-dominance as an
emergent property of some human-cognitive artefact
relations has important implications for understanding
the attribution and distribution of causal and other forms
of responsibility as well as agency relating to the actions
of human-cognitive artefact couplings. Interaction-
dominance is both indicated and constituted by the
phenomenon of Bpink noise^. Understanding the role
of noise in this regard will establish a necessary
theoretical groundwork for approaching the ethical and
political dimensions of relations between human cogni-
tion and digital cognitive artefacts. We argue that pink
noise in this context plays a salient role in the practical,
ethical, and political evaluation of coupling relations
between humans and cognitive artefacts, and subse-
quently in the responsible innovation of cognitive arte-
facts and human-artefact interfaces.
Keywords Extendedmind thesis . Cognitive artefacts .
Pink noise .Machine-human hybrid . Responsible
research and innovation . Distributed cognition .
Responsibility . Interaction-dominant systems .
Enhancement . Human enhancement technology.Value-
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Labour appears, rather, merely as a conscious
organ, scattered among the individual living
workers at numerous points in the mechanical
system; subsumed under the total process of the
machinery itself, as itself only a link in the system,
whose unity exists not in the living workers, but
rather in the living active machinery, which con-
fronts his individual, insignificant doings as a
mighty organism. ([1], p. 693).
The individual becomes the mere spectator of the
results of the functioning of the machines, or the
one who is responsible for the organisation of
technical ensembles putting the machines to work.
([2], p. 132).
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Introduction
There is growing recognition in the literature on cogni-
tive enhancement and neuroethics of the need for greater
attention to the role of cognitive artefacts in the techno-
logical intervention into and alteration of cognitive pro-
cesses. Fasoli [3] has argued for the need for greater
consideration of cognitive artefacts in neuroethics and
has developed a taxonomy of relationships between
cognitive artefacts and cognitive processes [4]. Like-
wise, Heersmink [5] has argued for the broadening of
neuroethics and cognitive enhancement debates to in-
clude more consideration of cognitive artefacts, includ-
ing emerging technologies such as transcranial stimula-
tion and neuro-prosthetics (e.g. [6]) but also greater
reflection on Benvironmental objects and structures^.
Heersmink [7] has also developed a multi-dimensional
framework for conceptualising integration between cog-
nitive artefacts and human agents. The broadening and
greater inclusivity of these descriptive and normative de-
bates to consider a broad range of cognitive artefacts as
enhancement technologies have been motivated by devel-
opments in what can broadly be referred to as 4E (embod-
ied, embedded, extended, enactive) approaches to cogni-
tion (see, for example, [8, 9]). Subsequently, this has
furthered the encounter between the debates in the area
of cognitive enhancement and those in 4E cognition (see,
for example, [10]). In short, if some or all cognitive arte-
facts are considered forms of enhancement technology,
then the form of cognition at issue falls within the domain
of 4E approaches. Our aim here is to contribute to this
discussion and the encounter between these two fields.
There remains however a lack of sustained en-
gagement both concerning the epistemology of
cognitive artefacts in the enhancement debate,
and the potential ethical and political challenges
arising from the increasing pervasiveness of digital
cognitive artefacts [11] in the fields of 4E (or
situated) cognition. It seems clear that discussions
of enhancement and cognitive enhancement in par-
ticular will increasingly centre around hybrid, hu-
man-artefact, cognitive systems, and specifically hu-
man + digital cognitive artefact systems.1 Prospective
technologies and scenarios for human cognitive enhance-
ment increasingly implicate hybrids of organic cognitive
systems (brains) and digital cognitive artefacts (digital
technologies), sometimes called cognitive computing.2
The world’s largest edu-business, Pearson [12], one of
the world’s largest computing companies, IBM [13],
Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft3 have shown
strong interest in the development and production of
cognitive computing systems applications for use in the
educational market, business, government, healthcare,
education, and other sectors. On the basis of these inter-
ests, there is a common vision of how machine intelli-
gence might perform as cognitive-enhancement technol-
ogy in various settings.
Consequently, addressing the epistemological as
well as ethical and political questions issuing from
cognitive artefacts is one of the most important tasks
for the debates concerning responsible research and
innovation (RRI) in human enhancement technologies.
This, more specifically, is how we hope to contribute to
the encounter between discussions in cognitive en-
hancement and those in 4E cognition. RRI is defined
by the European Commission as an Bapproach that
anticipates and assesses potential implications and soci-
etal expectations with regard to research and innovation,
with the aim to foster the design of inclusive and sus-
tainable research and innovation^ [14]. It has been
adopted as a research and support initiative within large
techno-science and innovation funding programmes
by many international and national funders including
but not limited to the European Commission’s
€80 billion Horizon2020 Programme, the UK’s
EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Science Research
Council),4 and the Dutch NWO, where RRI is a flagship
1 We understand digital cognitive artefacts simply as cognitive arte-
facts (defined below) that are digital in nature or incorporate digital
processes.
2 Cognitive computing describes technology platforms that combine
machine learning, reasoning, natural language processing, speech,
vision, human computer interaction, that mimic the functioning of the
human brain and help to improve human decisionmaking (http://www.
predictiveanalyticstoday.com/what-is-cognitive-computing/).
3 See, https://www.partnershiponai.org/
4 BResponsible Innovation is a process that seeks to promote creativity
and opportunities for science and innovation that are socially desirable
and undertaken in the public interest. Responsible Innovation acknowl-
edges, that innovation can raise questions and dilemmas, is often
ambiguous in terms of purposes and motivations and unpredictable
in terms of impacts, beneficial or otherwise. Responsible Innovation
creates spaces and processes to explore these aspects of innovation in
an open, inclusive and timely way. This is a collective responsibility,
where funders, researchers, stakeholders and the public all have an
important role to play. It includes, but goes beyond, considerations of
risk and regulation, important though these are.^
https://epsrc.ukri.org/research/framework/ (last accessed 14
September 2018)
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programme.5 While each funder defines RRI (or some-
times just RI, i.e. responsible innovation) in a slightly
different fashion, there are clear overarching common-
alities. There is an expanding literature on this approach
to bringing societal, ethical and political concerns di-
rectly into the research funding and subsequent innova-
tion process(es). These debates, though significant, are
outside the scope of this paper, which nonetheless situ-
ates itself within the scope of RRI as broadly defined
above (and in notes 5 and 6).
Cognitive Coupling
Relations between humans and digital cognitive artefacts
can be characterised as cognitive coupling where there is
communication or information flow within the coupled
system (human-cognitive artefact). The title of this paper,
Bthe over-extendedmind^, refers to a phenomenonwherein
(1) the cognitive coupling between a human and a cognitive
artefact can be described as Binteraction-dominant^ (a term
that we will define below); and (2) the interaction-
dominance is ethically and politically significant for how
we understand responsibility and agency. The Bover-ex-
tended mind^, we contend, has consequences pertaining
to the responsible innovation and value-sensitive design of
those cognitive artefacts that could potentially form
intraction-dominant systemswith humanminds and bodies.
Specifically, we argue that interaction-dominance as
an emergent property of some human-cognitive artefact
couplings has ramifications for the attribution of agency
and responsibility in a fashion that is not discussed in the
existing literature. While the characteristic of interaction-
dominance can be manifest in relations with all sorts of
cognitive artefacts, we think that the ethical and political
salience comes of the fore in the discussion of digital
cognitive artefacts that make use of algorithms (processes
or sets of rules used in calculations or other problem-
solving processes).6 Thus, there are specific implications
for discussions about responsible innovation or value-
sensitive design of digital cognitive artefacts and specif-
ically human – digital cognitive artefact interfaces. Con-
sequently, we argue that in view of the potential scenario
of the Bover-extended mind^, cognitive distance or dis-
ruption in the flow of information between certain kinds
of cognitive artefact and their human users can be con-
sidered a design-virtue and a key element to consider in
responsible innovation. To put this another way: building
in some forms of noise qua disruption of information
flow could be an aspect of value sensitive design in the
innovation of human – digital cognitive artefact inter-
faces. Noise can in some instances be an epistemic virtue.
Correspondingly, accessibility, durability, and intensity of
information flow, all dimensions of integration between
artefact and human agent, can in some cases be
undesirables.
Interaction-dominance in human-cognitive artefact
couplings or systems is both indicated and constituted
by the related phenomenon of Bpink noise^: a sub-type
of the general concept of noise. Thus, pink noise per-
forms an important heuristic role in identifying and
understanding interaction-dominant systems and the
over-extended mind phenomenon. To understand the
status and role of pink noise, and consequently
interaction-dominant systems, we need to first examine
how the general concept of noise operates in the loop of
interactions which constitutes the flow of information
between human and artefacts. This will establish the
theoretical groundwork for approaching the ethical and
political dimension of relations between human cogni-
tion and digital cognitive artefacts. As pink noise is
central to the constitution of interaction-dominance
and subsequently the over-extended mind, it plays a
significant role in the practical, ethical, and political
evaluation of coupling relations between humans and
cognitive artefacts.
The main body of this paper will thus focus on
characterising interaction-dominance in its relation to
pink noise in the context of human-cognitive artefact
coupling. We conclude with a further discussion of
some of the ethical and political dimensions of
interaction-dominant systems, already alluded to above.
We situate our discussion of the ethical and political
dimensions in the context of ongoing discussion
concerning cognitive artefacts and distributed morality
(e.g. [5, 18]). Thus, one important aspect of what we
hope to do here is a kind of translation work from
discussions in cognitive science and philosophy of mind
5 BNWO-MVI maps and facilitates the incorporation of ethical and
societal aspects of technological innovations early on in the design
process. Our aim? Responsible innovations that enjoy broad support in
society.^ https://www.nwo-mvi.nl/ (last accessed 14 September 2018)
6 Algorithms can be understood technically as sets of Bencoded
procedures^ that Btransform input data into a desired output based on
specified calculations^ ([15], p. 167). In more general language, an
algorithm is the result of ‘what is to be done’ with ‘how it should be
done’, or rather, ‘defining a problem’ and ‘naming the steps necessary
to solve that problem’ ([16], p. 17). Algorithms, insofar as they assign
relevance to sets of data, have a fundamental normative function. We
are grateful to Suzanna Kraak [17] for making this point.
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to discussions concerning responsible innovation and
value-sensitive design.
The Terms of Engagement
Before proceeding to the analysis of pink noise in its
relation to interaction-dominance, it will be helpful to
clarify our usage of several key ideas that have already
been mentioned above without sufficient elaboration. A
cognitive artefact is an Bartificial device designed to
maintain, display or operate upon information^ [19] in
order to Bfunctionally contribute to the performing of a
cognitive task^ [20]. The development of 4E ap-
proaches to cognition in the philosophy of mind has
reinforced the role of cognitive artefacts in cognitive
processes. 4E approaches to cognition emphasise the
importance of embodied engagement with the natural,
social, and technological milieu as a fundamental aspect
of human cognitive processes. There is a rich and grow-
ing literature in this field, andwhile there is a rather wide
heterogeneity of approaches, it does not seem unfair to
say that there is broad agreement that even our basic
cognitive processes are technologically or artefactually
mediated, structured, and scaffolded (e.g. [8, 9, 21–23]).
What is often at stake in debates under the umbrella of
4E cognition is the extent or degree to which cognitive
processes are extended beyond the body (into the envi-
ronment) and hence whether it is more appropriate to
think of cognition as extending into the external envi-
ronment, or somewhat less dramatically scaffolded by it.
Heersmink [5, 11] points out that extended cognition
should not be thought about in binary all or nothing
terms. Rather, he suggests that it is more appropriate to
think of a spectrum of extension relating to the Bkind
and intensity of information flow between agent and
scaffold, the accessibility of the scaffold, the durability
of the coupling between agent and scaffold.^ As we
shall explain, interaction-dominance represents an ex-
treme end of this spectrum, where the epistemological,
functional, and potentially (though not necessarily) phe-
nomenological delineations between agent and artefact
(scaffold) are obscured, precisely due to the dominance
of interactions between agent and artefact over discrete
agglomerated actions or processes. An interaction-
dominant system is one where it is not possible to
distinguish discrete causal cognitive components from
one another because the organisation of the system
arises in the interactions. Consequently, cognition pro-
cesses pertaining to such couplings should not be
analysed as discrete functions of encapsulated mole-
cules, neurons, neural structures, behaviours or other
modules without considering their context or mutual
interactions.
Noise is a phenomenon (or set of related phenomena)
present in any conceivable information channel [24],
and consequently in every cognitive process. As a work-
ing definition, we can say that noise involves irregular-
ities, interference, and distortions in the communication
between the target properties in the environment and the
sensory signal as well as in perceptual or cognitive
processes. Cognitive relations between humans and
cognitive artefacts will thus, de jure, involve noise. In
brief: noise is a given in information channels; informa-
tion channels are involved in all cognitive processes;
thus the extension, regardless of robustness and intensi-
ty of cognitive processes into cognitive artefacts or other
aspects of the built or natural environment, and subse-
quently an extension of cognitive processes with the aim
of enhancing or augmenting them will involve noise.
Noise in cognitive processes originates from at least
two sources. Internally, noise emanates from variability,
for instance, noise in neural activation, as when neurons
trigger differently on two occasions, despite the same
relevant initial conditions. Externally, it arises from
inadequate environmental conditions, e.g. listening a
conversation close to a busy motorway. In this sense,
noise refers to Bsmall (and frequent) fluctuations^ [25]
which may disturb the achieved stability of a supposed,
in this case cognitive, system. A system is considered
robust when it resists noise. Arguments in favour of
Bdevelopmental noise^, Bnoise-induced order^ and
Bnoise-oriented behaviour^ maintain that the structural
resilience of a system to noise may help individuals or
systems gain the ability to adapt to the environment or
achieve a higher level of functionality. We think that the
role of noise is an under-explored but central dimension
to understanding the cognitive, ethical, and eventually
social impact of human-artefact coupling. Despite the
emerging body of literature concerning digital cognitive
artefacts, for example, Heersmink on their taxonomy
[20], dimensions of integration [7], and metaphysics
[26] and Fasoli’s work on neuroethics [3], there is no
account of how noise might affect new models of
technology-mediated cognition. In this paper we are
particularly interested in the role of pink noise (a sub-
type of the umbrella concept noise) as both indicating
and constituting interaction-dominant human-artefact
cognitive systems. To understand the relation between
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interaction-dominance and pink noise we need to scru-
tinise how noise operates in the coupling dynamics
between human cognizing systems and digital cognitive
artefacts that are integrated into and can indeed be said
to enhance human cognition.
The idea that noise plays a salient and constitutive
role in this way faces some challenges. A first and
fundamental challenge issues from the debate within
cognitive science concerning whether the appearance
of pink noise does indicate an interaction-dominant
system. Second, there is the question of whether the
epistemological, ethical, and political questions raised
by demonstrating that some cognitive coupling may
lead to the emergence of interaction-dominant systems
are qualitatively or indeed quantitatively different from
questions raised where an interaction-dominant system
is not evidenced. We will address this in the final part of
the paper.
Prior to a more detailed consideration of pink noise
and interaction-dominant hybrid human-machine sys-
tems, it is important to emphasise the fundamental cor-
relation between noise and cognition, and more specif-
ically between noise and the distortion of cognition. We
have to understand noise not only as an object of per-
ception and cognition, but as partaking in the process of
perception and cognition. Inquiry into distortion of cog-
nitive processes is a necessary part of inquiring into the
conditions of possibility of perception and cognition.
Any philosophical inquiry into human agency must deal
also with the state of indecision and confusion associat-
ed with noise. Any epistemological enquiry into the
nature of knowledge, finally, must contend with the role
of noise as lived ambiguity, indecision and error in
communication processes – cognition is one such com-
munication process as it entails the expression and ex-
change of information. Noise as a central component of
the dynamics of all information systems [27] will have a
dramatic impact on the manner in which our cognitive
processes are technologically mediated. Despite its role
as a de jure precondition for cognition, an enabling
constraint, noise is a term that still carries many negative
connotations (unwanted signal, state of disorder or dis-
turbance that does not contain meaningful data or infor-
mation). These characterizations thus fail to recognise
the multi-scale complexity of noise or its intrinsically
functional relationship within cognitive, biological, so-
cial, political, and economic systems [28], as well as
inferential reason (as a process of making generalisa-
tions based on data while taking into account
uncertainty). From our perspective, it is evident that
the emergence and increasing pervasiveness of human-
machine cognitive hybrids augments the necessity of an
analysis of noise in cognitive systems as cognitive pro-
cesses are increasingly coupled with and are extended
into the ever-expanding array of digital technologies and
networks (e.g. [29]).
We now turn to the role of Bpink noise^ as constitut-
ing and indicating interaction-dominant systems before
discussing some potential ethical considerations arising
out of the formation of human-digital artefact couplings
that can be characterised as interaction-dominant sys-
tems and subsequently, the consequences of our analysis
for RRI approaches to enhancement via cognitive
artefacts.
Pink Noise and Interaction-Dependent Systems
Extended Cognition and Sensory Substitution Devices
It is helpful here to first review the idea of Bextended
cognition^ on which our claims about noise centre.
Coarsely put, it is the idea that cognitive systems are
extended beyond the boundary of a discrete organism.
Cognition is not confined to the limits of our brain, but is
attached to embodied sensorimotor processes which are
a restraint upon cognition, and not the final limit of
cognition. Cognition, subsequently, should be under-
stood as a phenomenon that encompasses processes
implicating brain, body, and environment. Moreover,
the role of the brain in the process of cognition is not
just as a sensory-machine that reacts specifically to
certain stimuli or sensory modalities but rather a com-
plex Btask-machine,^ that can, to a degree, re-establish
function with input from other senses [30, 31]. This
latter aspect is the domain of sensory substitution (SS),
where touch or audition, for example, transmit informa-
tion that is otherwise not available, due, for example, to
a visual impairment. Sensory substitution devices
(SSDs) have been available for a long time. A blind
person’s cane, for example, translates environmental
structure into haptic and proprioceptive feedback and
sign language translates visual stimuli into language.
There are numerous experiments testing if SSDs can
become part of extended cognitive systems (e.g.
[32–34]). These experiments have shown that sensory-
substitution devices can indeed become part of extended
cognitive systems and, additionally, these artefacts
Nanoethics
partially constitute the extended cognitive system. To
prove this, researchers have looked at the changes in the
information flow (between the nervous system and the
devices) produced while the participants engaged with
their environment during the task [35, 36]. These exper-
iments used detrended fluctuation analysis (a method to
measure structural information by quantifying the self-
similarity of a time series in a system) and produced a
signal that can be considered pink noise.
Pink Noise
Pink noise is a type of variability in a data series that is
neither random nor predictable, it has a fractal fluctuat-
ing structure. We can collect this data series, for exam-
ple, by an experiment in which the participants have to
press a key in response to a signal on a computer screen
[37]. It is possible to measure the time it takes the
participant to press the key as a result of noticing the
signal (key-press response time), and the time it takes
the participant to release the key to return to the waiting
stance for the next trial (key-release response time). The
two data series (key press and key release) are subjected
to spectral analyses that can identify the pink noise in
each separate data series. Pink noise is manifest in the
inherent residual variability that remains after the aver-
age time interval that each participant produces (for each
target interval) is removed from each trial series. Con-
sequently, we can say that pink noise is revealed in the
structure of the Bbackground noise^ of cognitive perfor-
mance – the inherent variability of a participant’s cog-
nition of passing time.
In the case of a cognitive system, the presence of pink
noise indicates that the connections between the differ-
ent parts are highly non-linear; that means small input
changes result in counter-intuitively large changes in the
output [35, 36, 38–40]. Time series of human perfor-
mances (e.g. reaction time, memory retrieval etc.) ex-
pose patterns of variation with a structure based on self-
similarity – this means that the shape looks like itself
however much you zoom in or out, like Romanesco
broccoli. This self-similar property is true for a type of
patterns known as fractals. Fractals are termed infinitely
complex because the more closely you look at the
object, the more complex it appears. In normal geome-
try, shapes are defined by a set of rules (i.e. triangle:
three straight lines that are connected). Fractal geometry
also defines shapes by rules, nonetheless these rules are
different. In fractal geometry a shape is made in two
steps: first by making a rule about how to change a
certain shape. This rule is then applied to the shape
again and again, ad infinitum. In maths when you
change something it is usually called a function. Thus,
a function is applied to a shape recursively.
In its fractal fluctuating structure, pink noise ex-
presses the iteration of convergent solutions – tending
toward the same result – for common functional prob-
lems. Like the branching structure of a tree: from the
bottom to the top of a tree, branches become thinner in
diameter as they become more numerous. That is, a
small piece of the tree looks to a certain extent like an
entire tree. A large tree is a complex object, but it is
formed by repeating a simple process over and over
again.
Thanks to its pattern, pink noise illustrates optimal
coordination among the components of a cognitive sys-
tem and the task environment. Pink noise manifests both
stability and adaptability, both attributes characteristic
for healthy complex systems [41]. Numerous dynamical
diseases (diseases that occur due to an abrupt change in
the natural rhythms of the body, i.e. cardiac arrhythmia
or epilepsy) have as a common form a transition away
from healthy fractal variability and toward a loss of
complexity in the dynamical unfolding of a system’s
behaviour across time [42]. These fractal patterns pop
up repeatedly in the natural world: physical, biological
and economic systems exhibit pink noise [43, 44]. Be-
cause of this, some researchers describe it as being
ubiquitous [41] and appearing when the components
of a system are so firmly integrated with one another
that their functions cannot be explained independently.
Van Orden et al. [35] argue that if we can observe the
activity of pink noise during the human performance of
a list of cognitive tasks, this demonstrates that the cog-
nitive system is fully embodied and includes aspects that
are extended to the periphery of the organism.
Fractal dynamics inform us about the coordination of
component processes in living systems. In this respect, it
is very revealing that the common fractal signature of a
healthy functioning system is found extensively in
Nanoethics
natural systems that self-organise their behaviour. Self-
organisation requires a specific type of interaction to
coordinate the processes that must perform together.
The correct form of this interaction equipoises compet-
itive and cooperative processes to produce an adaptive
and flexible functional configuration or critical state,
hence the scientific term Bextended criticality.^ The
interaction that leads to critical states has been calculat-
ed for simple physical systems but it is also valid for a
working hypothesis for more complex biological and
cognitive behaviour. The name for this kind of interac-
tion among component processes is interaction-
dominant dynamics. The key fact of interaction-
dominant dynamics is that system components change
each other’s dynamics to coordinate their collective
behaviour [45] to the extent that delineation between
functional components is not rigid but rather
characterised by its plasticity.
Following from the previous two sub-sections it is
clear that coupling between human perceiver and arte-
fact in the case of some sensory-substitution devices can
be constitutive of the pink noise (in the analysis of
information flow in the coupling relation) that is indic-
ative of interaction-dominant systems. The next sub-
section will show that this relation applies to a wider
class of human-cognitive artefact relations, including
digital artefacts and human-machine interfaces.
Computer Mouse Experiments
Dotov et al. [33] have shown that cognitive systems can
be made to extend beyond the outer limits of the organ-
ism to include digital artefacts in a manner that can be
characterised as interaction-dominant. In their experi-
ments, the participants played a simple video game that
involved controlling an object on a computer screen
using a computer mouse. At random moments during
one-minute trials, the connection between the mouse
and the object it controls was interrupted momentarily
before returning to normal. While the mouse was oper-
ating normally, they found evidence of pink noise at the
computer mouse interface (hand motions followed the
mathematical pattern of pink noise), which diminished
during the interruption. Using motion-tracking equip-
ment they recorded the three-dimensional trajectory of
the hand-tool system (human and interface); the hand
motions of the computer mouse exhibited the nested
fractal structure of pink noise (formal and statistical
self-similarity). This is where the noise is manifest: at
the interface of body and tool [33], because BPink [1/f]
noise cannot be encapsulated; it is not the product of a
particular component of the mind or body.^ ([35], p.
345). Dotov et al. [33] applied an analysis that has been
used to establish long-range correlations in the time
series which are expressed as pink noise: these long-
range correlations stand for long-term dependencies in a
signal between the present observation and a large set of
previous observations. Thus, the presence of long-range
correlations implies the presence of multiple, nested
timescales in the system, responsible for the emergence
of patterns in the system. Additionally, Dotov et al. [46]
also prepared the experiment to measure physical indi-
cators of stress, such as respiration rate, heart rate, and
galvanic skin response (changes in the electrical activity
of the skin triggered by emotional or physiological
responses). They found an increase in all three at pre-
cisely the same moment when the mathematical pattern
transitioned from pink noise to chaos.
This shows that, under optimal connection, the com-
puter mouse (a digital cognitive artefact comprising a
human-machine interface) is part of the smooth func-
tioning interaction-dominant system involved in the task
and that during the mouse disruption the pink noise at
the computer mouse interface decreases momentarily,
pointing out that the mouse is no longer part of the
extended interaction-dominant system. Interaction-
dominant dynamics [47] express the plasticity of the
system’s elements and of the communication modes
among these elements. Coordinated processes (like the
use of a computer mouse to point at something) can alter
the integrative action of components to the extent that it
is hard, and sometimes unfeasible, to assign tightly
defined and unique roles to specific elements. An
interaction-dominant system entails that any singular
component of the system interacts through the system
as a whole, remodelling the dynamics of the other
components and overriding the dynamics that the com-
ponents would exhibit separately. In interaction-
dominant systems we cannot treat the components of
the system in isolation. Because of the extensive feed-
back in interaction-dominant systems, one cannot iso-
late any one component to determine with exactitude
what function it has in relation to a particular behaviour.
Since interactions dominate, organisation is emergent
and depends on the context. The parts that constitute
the system arrange themselves according to the current
demands of context and perform functions according to
this. That is: components can flexibly tie together or
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split to befit the changing conditions for a given task
[48]. Thus, organisation in an interaction-dominant sys-
tem is an emergent coordination, and instead of
responding to local divisions and parts, this coordination
emerges in accordance with ongoing changes in infor-
mation flow [49]. Because of these ongoing changes,
the behaviour of the components in any particular
interaction-dominant system is not predictable from
their behaviour in isolation or from their behaviour in
some other interaction-dominant system. In other
words, interaction-dominant systems are not modular
in their design nor in terms of Bmodular cognitive
architecture^; they are in a deep way unified in that the
accountability for the system behaviour is scattered
across all of the components.
The Ready-to-Hand Computer Mouse
As a result of changing the focus of attention from the
information flow to the presence of pink noise, van
Orden et al. [35] argued that the participant-computer
system formed an interaction-dominant system, and also
provided some empirical confirmation for an aspect of
Heidegger’s transition from present-at-hand to ready-to-
handmodes of experience [50]. Present-at-hand refers to
our theoretical understanding of a world constituted of
objects as standing apart from or against the subject or
agent; it is a mode of comprehension. But with the
Bready-to-hand^ notion of experience, Heidegger ar-
gued that people do not notice familiar, functional tools,
but instead they Bsee through^ them to a task at hand, for
precisely the same reasons that one does not think of the
way that one’s fingers hold the pen while writing. The
tools are us. Similarly, proponents of extended cogni-
tion have argued that the artefacts into which cognition
is extended must be functionally transparent to the agent
[11], they must be used without the agent actively think-
ing about what they are doing, i.e. how they are using
the artefact or incorporating it into their cognitive or
motile processes. The distinction that this builds is be-
tween an artefact rendered transparent and integrated
into cognitive or motile processes and an object that is
conspicuous and Bstands against^ the controlling agent.
BStanding against^ does not necessarily imply a hostile
relationship, it is a general term used in the phenome-
nological literature for the epistemological-experienced
status of objects in the world vis-à-vis the subject, but it
does imply an experienced distance between subject or
agent and object.
The French philosopher Merleau-Ponty [51] built
upon this analysis to argue that bodily prosthetics, like
a walking cane, are, with use, integrated into what he
called the Bbody schema^, an integrated system of bodi-
ly motile possibilities functioning both at the level of
unconscious sensorimotor processes and consciously
experienced movement. From the perspective of both
passive (ones we are not aware of) and active (ones we
are) conscious processes, the prosthesis becomes part of
the body schema. This form of interaction-dominant
coupling could be interrupted if for example the stick
was accidentally dropped or struck from the hand,
returning it to its phenomenological status of conspicu-
ous external object. The discussion of digital artefacts
that we engage in here proceeds on much the same
grounds. What differs are the descriptive mechanisms
for demonstrating the interaction-dominant character of
the coupling.
Returning to the experimental setting, when the com-
puter mouse was controlling correctly the on-monitor
pointer, the participants experienced their control of the
object in the video game, they could see through the tool
to focus on the task they were performing, the presence
of pink noise was evident and the computer mouse was
experienced as ready-to-hand. When the connection
between mouse movements and the on-screen control
of the object was perturbed, the participants were con-
cerned about the performance of the mouse, they were
no longer able to see through the malfunctioning tool,
there is no presence of pink noise and they experienced
it as present-to-hand. The phenomenological accounts
of ready-to-handedness or prosthetic integration into the
body schema are equally applicable here in the case of a
digital artefact and accompany the presence and absence
of pink noise in the analysis of information flow.
The phenomenological accounts developed by Hei-
degger [50] and Merleau-Ponty [51] are also significant
because they bring to the fore several important charac-
teristics of interaction-dominant systems. The accounts
of Bready-to-hand^ tools and prostheses integrated in
body schemata do assume a central subjective control-
ler, an agent whose intentional relations with the sur-
rounding world drive the processes in question, even if
biases can be built into artefacts that condition their
usage and potential integration into a body schema.
Philosophers of technology have pointed out that arte-
facts are not value-neutral but have affordances and
indeed values built into their design. These embedded
histories may or may not be apparent to the designers
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themselves, but often – one can imagine examples
where this is not the case, such as when an artefact is
transferred outside of its originally intended use
context, in play for example – condition the use of the
artefact, undermining any claims to absolute
sovereignty on the part of a central controlling-acting
agent. Nonetheless, the phenomenological example
brings to the fore the question of agency in interaction-
dominant systems. Closely linked to the question of
agency is the issue of passivity in the emergence of
interaction-dominance. In both the example of the
ready-to-hand tool and the prosthesis that has been
incorporated into the body schema, the integration into
cognitive and motile processes happens in a manner that
is termed passive, or not fully present to consciousness.
In other words, the agent or subject is not consciously
aware (in the way that we normally use the term) of the
full integration of the artefact into its cognitive and
motile processes. In fact, as many phenomenologists
like to point out, when conscious attention is turned to
the relation between the body and the artefact the inte-
gration is broken and the artefact appears suddenly
conspicuous and often unwieldy.What we wish to argue
is that in some settings this conspicuousness, which can
also be characterised as or via the concept of noise, qua
disruption of information flow, can be an epistemic and
ethical virtue.
Pink Noise as the Evidence of an Extended Cognitive
System
The presence of pink noise during the performance of
human-artefact coupling as demonstrative and constitu-
tive of an extended and interaction-dominant system
cognitive system, where the device is not merely caus-
ally related to the system but is constitutive of the
system as such illustrates the relevance of noise, and
specifically the sub-type pink noise, to an understanding
of cognitive processes. This, along with the significant
amount of methodology from complex systems theory
that is being brought into cognitive sciences, provides
good reason to doubt some of the methodological tru-
isms that cognitive sciences students are commonly
taught, namely that a good experimental design in the
cognitive sciences looks for the minimization of error
variance (noise). A significant amount of nonlinear dy-
namical modelling techniques refute this conception by
taking the structure of noise to be the primary data, as
we do here. We understand data as the outcomes of
observations, measurements, and procedures that the
scientists carry out. Quite often these outcomes will be
measures of fluctuations (as signals depending on the
theoretical framework), which is fundamentally noise.
In cases like the experiments by van Orden et al. [35]
and Anderson et al. [47], noise no longer should be
received as meaningless fluctuations that can be
overlooked or ignored as second order data, nor con-
fused as uncertainty. Precisely because here, pink noise
is the evidence (at the core of the system) that humans
and computers together can comprise unified
interaction-dominant systems: pink noise designates a
unified system of parts. It is important to emphasise the
temporal dimension of interaction-dominance alongside
the functional indiscernibility of causal components
within an interaction-dominant system. Chemero [52,
53] very often gives the example of walking. When we
walk on a level path, our stride length will appear to be
mostly the same, but there are subtle variations. These
variations create a system that has a Blongmemory .^ It is
the very same long memory processes with long-term
correlations that exhibit pink noise fluctuations. The
way we walked twenty paces ago affects the pace we
are about to take. If the system were not interconnected
in the way that it is, it would show randomness. Pink
noise is neither regular nor random; it is an irregular,
fractal pattern that resembles itself on large and small
scales and stands for a system whose parts interact
densely in real time.7
The Many Virtues of Noise: Heuristic, Epistemic
and Ethical
Let us return briefly to the key aspect of the summary
definition of interaction-dominant systems: This entails
that any singular component of the system interacts
through the system as a whole, remodelling the dynam-
ics of the other components and overriding the dynamics
that the components would exhibit separately. The result
is a functional and temporal indiscernibility and
7 Thornton and Gilden [54] and Torre and Wagenmakers [55] argued
that 1/f-like scaling might result from a component-dominant system –
components which interact in sequence as in a machine, rather than an
interaction-dominant system. Recently, however, Ihlen and Vereijken
[56] have shown that the presence of multifractality demonstrates
definitively that a system is interaction-dominant. Ihlen and Vereijken
reanalysed the data from van Orden et al. [35], and showed that it is
multifractal.
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plastisity of causal components in an interaction-
dominant system. The experiments discussed in the
previous section demonstrate that the emergence of such
systems is possible under quite routine conditions. Our
contention here is that interaction-dominant systems, as
emergent but common occurrences, can, by the fact that
they do not consist of discernible causal, temporal or
functional components, complicate or render impossible
the assignment of agency or potentially responsibility as
well as our understanding of autonomy in ever more
prevalent human-digital artefact couplings. This is in
part illustrated by several counter examples. Recall the
previous example of a walking stick used as a sensory
substitution device being integrated in the body schema
of an agent to an extent that when in use an interaction-
dominant system emerges. The light-weight stick may
offer affordances [52] (we understand affordance here in
a very basic sense as a perceptually manifest possibility
of an object for action in an environment) for more
nefarious use, for example thwacking others on the
street. In such cases, despite the existence of an
interaction-dominant system having emerged, the as-
signment of agency and responsibility for the action is
not in doubt. Though the intensity of the extension is
such that functional delimiting of parts is not possible,
there remains little doubt of a central, subjective in this
case, controller who is the agent of the action and hence
the potential subject of responsibility. When the coupled
artefact makes use of algorithms for problem solving,
the situation may be different. It is helpful here to parse
the discussion through Floridi’s and Sanders’ [18] dis-
cussion of distributed morality.
Drawing on theories of distributed cognition wherein
a set of cognitive agents has knowledge that no one
individual within the set has, Floridi builds an account
where a set of morally neutral or negligible acts interact
to create a morally salient act as an emergent property of
the interaction – when two potentially neutral states or
acts interact in the right way the result of the interaction
is morally salient. It is important here to understand the
salient act in two possible ways: on the one hand, it
might be an emergent property of the interaction or it
could be the cumulative effect of otherwise below moral
salience threshold acts accumulating to pass the thresh-
old of salience. The analysis here is decidedly conse-
quentialist, or Breceiver-perspective^ since salience is
gauged in terms of overall impact on the environment
and its inhabitants, not on actor intentions. Such in-
stances of distributed morality can go both ways, i.e.
toward positive and negative evaluation. Floridi pro-
vides the example of consumer driven corporate respon-
sibility programmes which require a critical mass of
participation to become salient.
What distinguishes cases of distributed morality
from interaction-dominance? It is certainly possible
that distributed cognition or morality networks can
be interaction-dominant, but they are not necessarily
so. In the examples discussed by Floridi and Sanders
[18], the delimiting of discrete causal components
and behaviours is possible, responsibility for certain
temporal or functional events in the process of a
network interaction or process can still be assigned.
This is not the case in an interaction-dominant sys-
tem. We should be careful to remain specific in our
understanding of what an interaction-dominant sys-
tem is and how it is empirically identified, hence the
importance of pink noise in this discussion.
Heersmink [5, 11] helpfully contrasts Floridi’s dis-
tributed morality approach with the more actor-
network theory influenced notion of Bdistributed
agency^ developed by Verbeek [57]. Verbeek’s ac-
count confronts what he argues is the non-value-
neutrality of certain artefacts in context. It is not so
much that values or designers’ intentions are embed-
ded in artefacts in a way that directly impacts a
morally relevant context, but rather that aspects of
technology become value-charged within certain
contexts to the extent that it is not possible to say
that the artefact is value-neutral as the meaning of
its functionality can only appear in a context.
Heersmink, following Verbeek, refers to the example
of an ultrasound machine noting that the enlarged
size of the imaging, the possibility of discerning
gender, in other words, the personification of the
foetus via the imagining technology, is not value-
neutral and that this can only be assessed in context.
Examples such as this may be morally salient, but
may still lack the same characteristic of interaction-
dominance, namely the specific form of functional
integration demonstrated by the appearance of pink
noise. The lack of interaction-dominance is signifi-
cant because the possibility for a clear if not totally
transparent delineation of functional causality and
competence within a system or network allows for
a clearer, if not necessarily transparent, assessment
of responsibility.
We can imagine examples where the demonstration
of interaction-dependence, particularly in the relation
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between human and digital cognitive artefacts (artefacts
making use of decision making and problem solving
rules) has particular significance in assessing responsi-
bility. There are reports of systemic racial bias in some
decision-making algorithms, for example the COMPAS
system used to assess the likelihood of recidivism for
accused criminals. Speilkamp [58] summarised the find-
ings of ProPublica [59]:
ProPublica, a Pulitzer Prize winning not-for-profit
news organisation, analysed risk assessment soft-
ware known as COMPAS. It is being used to
forecast which criminals are most likely to
reoffend. Guided by such forecasts, judges in
courtrooms throughout the United States make
decisions about the future of defendants and con-
victs, determining everything from bail amounts
to sentences. When ProPublica compared COM-
PAS’s risk assessments for more than 10,000 peo-
ple arrested in one Florida county with how often
those people actually went on to reoffend, it dis-
covered that the algorithm Bcorrectly predicted
recidivism for black and white defendants at
roughly the same rate.^ But when the algorithm
was wrong, it was wrong in different ways for
blacks and whites. Specifically, Bblacks are almost
twice as likely as whites to be labelled a higher
risk but not actually re-offend.^
Algorithmic decision making can be biased for a
number of reason, including that often unconscious or
implicit biases of those writing the algorithms are built
into their rule making structures, or for reasons un-
known to engineers because the mechanisms of the
algorithm have been blackboxed. In cases such as
COMPAS, the digital artefact is supposed to provide
guidance to a human decision maker who, in these cases
at least, remains the central controlling agent (to use the
language of extended cognition). However, if usage of
the interface is such that there is evidence of the emer-
gence of an interaction-dominant system the temporal
and functional delineation of competencies within the
decision making process may be difficult to discern (we
introduce this as a hypothetical, not as an actual assess-
ment of the COMPAS system). In situations where such
delineations are essential for the possibility of assigning
legal or moral responsibility and also for the possibility
of appeal due to evidence of bias somewhere in the
components of the system, prior to the formation of
the interaction-dominant systems (or after the fact) the
appearance of pink noise is not only a potentially useful
heuristic, but a possible canary in the proverbial mine.
We do not mean to suggest that testing for pink noise is a
way of overcoming the issues pertaining to the use of
automated decision-making systems in the criminal jus-
tice system, nor even that bias introduced by the algo-
rithms used by systems such as COMPAS may some-
how be worse than unextended (into digital cognitive
artefacts) human biases. We could also envision a situ-
ation wherein biases embedded in computer algorithms
could be corrected for by other computer algorithms.
Rather, that pink noise is a potentially helpful and im-
portant indicator of interaction-dominant relations, and
that the latter may be undesirable in contexts where the
identification of functional and temporal causal account-
ability is considered required. Pink noise is a heuristic
key to the phenomenon that we called, at the beginning
of this article, the over-extended mind. Hence, we think
that the role of pink noise is potentially important further
upstream in the design process and has lessons for the
responsible or value-sensitive design and innovation of
digital cognitive artefacts for the purposes of cognitive
or other forms of enhancement. The over-extendedmind
and with it the role of pink noise point to the importance
of distance and functional demarcation as an epistemic,
ethical, and even social-political virtue in the design of
interfaces between humans and digital cognitive arte-
facts. In other words, it points to noise qua disturbance
in human-digital artefact coupling as a potential episte-
mic, ethical and social-political virtue in value-sensitive
design. While interaction-dominance can certainly be a
virtue in the case of sensory substitution prosthetics (e.g.
the walking stick) it is less likely to be so when the
coupled artefact has its own decision-making processes
and rules that may not be transparent or available to
other nodes in the network and when the delineation of
functional competence and linear temporal relations is
central to the moral, political, or legal evaluation of an
action or behaviour. The goal of seamless integration
with digital artefacts may have unforeseen negative
consequences, while distance, disruption of information
flow, and distraction, classical noisy enemies of cogni-
tion, may turn out to be virtues after all as the extension
of morally, legally, and politically salient decision mak-
ing and behaviours into digital artefacts becomes in-
creasingly pervasive. Thought and reflection, as op-
posed to cognition, are after all often noisy and make
use of resistances and interference to become more
adaptive. As we look to digital artefacts to enhance all
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sorts of capacities, this desirability of distance, demar-
cation, and even disruption may be worth remembering.
In his seminal paper, BDo artifacts have politics?^,
Langdon Winner [60] argued convincingly that they do.
A further difficulty emerges when one faces artefacts or
technical assemblages that make it increasingly difficult
to unravel the politics embedded in them from one’s
own. This is a situation that we think is made more
likely and more prevalent by the increasing pervasive-
ness of digital cognitive artefacts and, in some cases, the
emergence of ethically salient interaction-dominant sys-
tems. In this context, some noise between us and our
digital tools may not just help to discern both responsi-
bility as well as, in the case of pink noise, potential
issues in assessing certain type of responsibility, but
may also be a key indicator in the responsible innova-
tion of human-machine interfaces.
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